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Arbitral Value Judgments in Health and





T HE influence of personal beliefs and values on the judgments
of judicial and quasi-judicial decision-makers, such as labor
arbitrators, continues to be ignored almost totally in the literature
of labor law and labor arbitration.' The research that has been
done on this subject, however, demonstrates that prevailing ideas
about ethics, humanity, law, private property, economics and the
nature of the employer-worker relationship not only condition the
thinking of these decision-makers, but also provide them with the
ultimate standards for judgment. These value judgments pre-posi-
tion a decision-maker's approach to particular case situations,
thereby exercising a powerful influence on the outcomes of those
cases.
A study of arbitral decisions in cases involving subcontracting
and out-of-unit transfers of work,2 for example, identified a domi-
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nant value theme: management rights are necessary for the con-
tinued existence of the free enterprise system, and the pursuit of
efficiency is one of the most important and fundamental rights of
management. The decisions studied demonstrated arbitral accept-
ance of efficiency as the greatest good and the resultant presump-
tion that the right to subcontract is essential to the competitive
survival of the firm.$
That study focused on subcontracting because those decisions
were very likely to contain value expressions and orientations
given the clash between the goals of maximum efficiency and em-
ployee job security. This study focuses on health and safety dis-
putes because the even more fundamental clash between manage-
ment's rights to operate the enterprise and workers' rights to a
safe and healthful workplace is most likely to evoke arbitral value
judgments.
The research sources for published decisions were the Bureau
of National Affairs Labor-Arbitration Reports and Commerce
Clearinghouse Labor Arbitration Awards: a total of 584 reported
arbitration decisions involving health and safety disputes from
1945 to 1984.4 Despite the large number of cases used, no justifia-
ble claim can be made that these cases constitute a representative
sample of arbitral opinions in this subject area since only a rela-
tively small percentage of arbitration decisions are published and
those were chosen by subjective editorial judgment. The report-
ing services also make no systematic effort to publish "old pros"
rather than lesser known arbitrators. Having said that, however,
we should add that there is no evidence that arbitrators have been
deciding these cases in private any differently than they have been
deciding them in public-but only a thorough analysis of unpub-
lished decisions will answer that question.'
For purposes of analysis, these safety and health cases were
divided into four major categories: Refusals to work for reasons of
3. Id.
4. A total of 743 cases were examined for this study, of which 159 cases involving
miscellaneous subjects were excluded. Those miscellaneous subjects included employer fail-
ure to pay hazard premiums, employer failure to pay for lost time due to shutdowns caused
by safety problems, employer refusal to provide safety equipment, employee failure to
properly. operate safety equipment, and cases involving OSHA "walk around" pay.
5. For a study examining the representative nature of published arbitration decisions,
see Stieber, Block & Corbitt, in Cole, How Representative are Published Decisions, in 37 NAT'L
ACAD. oF ARB. PROC 170 (1985).
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safety or health; the formulation and implementation of safety
rules; crew size determinations which raise safety issues; and dis-
ease and disability cases where safety is an important
consideration.
For those interested in aggregate numbers, we have included
in an Appendix tables providing numerical breakdowns of case
types and outcomes in each category, as well as the standards of
proof and outcomes in cases involving refusals to work for reasons
of health and safety. We have also tabulated the standards of
proof in these refusal to work cases over time.
Clearly, however, this is not a quantitative study. A reader
focusing on win-loss rates, even though base rates across types of
cases support our analysis, will miss the main point of this Article.
Workers can win these cases despite heavy burdens and stringent
standards of proof. Some outcomes may also reflect numerous cri-
teria not germane to either the insubordination or the health and
safety issue which we have recorded but not tabulated for the pur-
pose of this Article.6
Whatever the win-loss rate, the thrust of our Article remains
the same: That arbitral value judgments establish the standards of
proof and presumptions that shape arbitrators' conceptions of
health and safety cases by focusing on management rights rather
than workers' rights. These value judgments constitute the cur-
rent arbitral common law in this area.
I. CONTROLLING ARBITAL VALUE JUDGMENTS
A. Refusal to work cases
Almost forty years ago, distinguished arbitrator Harry Shul-
man set forth in Ford Motor Company7 the principle of "work first,
grieve later." In that case, a union representative countermanded
a management order temporarily assigning employees to work in
higher job classifications because that order was allegedly in viola-
tion of a long-standing practice of temporary assignments to lower
but not higher classifications. Shulman ruled that "normally" an
employee must obey a legitimate work order even if the employee
is convinced the order is improper. According to Shulman, the
6. See infra criteria cited at note 17.
7. Ford Motor Co., 3 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 779 (1944) (Shulman, Arb.).
1985] 647
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employees should have worked in the higher classification and
then protested by filing a grievance since "the grievance proce-
dure would have provided them adequate recompense for the
wrong."" Otherwise, Shulman said, individual action would be
substituted for collective action and the grievance procedure
would be replaced with extra-contractual methods so that no en-
terprise could operate:
[A]n industrial plant is not a debating society. Its objective is production.
When a controversy arises, production cannot wait for exhaustion of the
grievance procedure. While that procedure is being pursued, production
must go on. And someone must have the authority to direct the manner in
which it is to go on until the controversy is settled. That authority is vested
in supervision. It must be vested here because the responsibility for produc-
tion is also vested here; and responsibility must be accompanied by author-
ity. It is fairly vested there because the grievance procedure is capable of
adequately recompensing employees for abuse of authority by supervision.9
Shulman allowed for exceptions to his rule: when obedience
to a management order would require commission of a criminal
or otherwise unlawful act or create an "unusual health hazard or
other serious sacrifice." 10 Shulman's "work first, grieve later"
rule, reflecting the underlying value judgment that management
has the right to direct and control the workforce, has become an
axiom of labor relations as has his "threat to health or safety"
exception to the rule.
Arbitrators, however, do not literally except health and safety
from the "work first, grieve later" rule. Arbitral application of
the rule in cases where employees refuse to obey management or-
ders because of perceived or actual threats to health and safety
reflects an insubordination mode of analysis. Management's right
to direct and control the workplace becomes the analytic starting
point, and the challenge to that right, i.e., a refusal to work, is
insubordination. This approach relegates the safety and health
claim to an affirmative defense to the insubordination charge.
In this insubordination mode of analysis, the employer meets
its burden of proof by establishing only the usual elements consti-
tuting insubordination-that a direct order was given to the em-
ployees by a legitimate management authority, that the employees
8. Id. at 782.
9. Ford Motor Co., 3 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 779, 781 (1944) (Shulman, Arb.).
10. Id.
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were warned of the consequences of refusal, and that the employ-
ees refused to obey the order. As far as the employer is con-
cerned, therefore, there is nothing that distinguishes a refusal to
work for reasons of health or safety from any other type of refusal
to work case."1 Certainly, the employer is not obliged to prove
that the work assignment did not endanger an employee's health
or safety. 12
It is the employee who must carry the burden of ultimate per-
suasion by establishing the sufficiency of his or her reason for re-
fusing the work assignment, thus proving to an arbitrator's satis-
faction that a health or safety hazard justified disobedience. 3 In
only one out of the 154 refusal to work cases did the arbitrator
also put a burden of ultimate persuasion on the employer to prove
the existence of a safe and healthful workplace.1 4 In that case, the
arbitrator stated: "If the warning device was defective, I think
that in view of the accompanying circumstances, that it is not too
much of a burden to place on the Company to ask it to demon-
strate not only was the machine defective but also the odors pre-
sent did not present a danger. 1 5 Even this case is not without
ambiguity concerning the burden of proof, however, since the ar-
bitrator had asserted earlier in the opinion that "the grievants
must establish first that they had the right to refuse to work
... ," In one other case, the arbitrator was obliged by a specific
contractual provision involving health and safety to put the bur-
den of ultimate persuasion on the employer.17 In only two other
11. For good illustrations of this approach, see Morgan Eng'g Co., 77-1 Lab. Arb.
Awards (CCH) 1 8021 (1976) (Gibson, Arb.); LaClede Steel Co., 71-1 Lab. Arb. Awards
(CCH) 8182 (1971) (Volz, Arb.); Allied Chem. Corp., 47 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 686 (1966)
(Hilpert, Arb.); St. Joseph Lead Co., 16 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 138, 143 (1951) (Hilpert, Arb.).
12. As one arbitrator put it:
The burden of establishing by the preponderance of the evidence that a prima
facie ground for suspension or discharge existed rests on the Company. ...
Here the Company sustained that burden of proof merely by proving the re-
fusal to accept a work assignment within the scope of [the Grievant's] job as a
Maintenance Machinist.
St. Joseph Lead Co., 16 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 138, 143 (1951) (Hilpert, Arb.).
13. LaClede Steel Co., 71-1 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8182 (1971) (Volz, Arb.).
14. Miller Printing Mach. Co., 70-1 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8438 (1969) (Krimsly,
Arb.).
15. Id. at 4443.
16. Id. at 4442.




refusal to work cases did a contractual provision arguably affect
the burden or the outcome of the case."
The point that must be underscored, therefore, is that most
arbitrators in allocating the burden of proof in these refusal cases,
rely upon value judgments concerning reserved management
rights, not upon specific contractual provisions. Similarly, contrac-
tual health and safety language, usually general, seldom specific,
did appear in a certain number of cases examined. Arbitrators
usually noted and then rarely relied upon such provisions in their
opinions. Thus, as with management rights, comments about
health and safety in arbitrators' opinions primarily reflect the ar-
bitrator's value judgments concerning health and safety, not spe-
cific contractual provisions.
Consequently, the whole orientation to this type of refusal to
work case takes a health and safety dispute and makes it a matter
of insubordination with health and safety merely a mitigating fac-
tor. Although technically the employer carries the burden of
proof in all discipline cases, the practical effect of this orientation
in refusal to work for reasons of health and safety cases is to shift
the burden of proof concerning the decisive issue to the dis-
charged or otherwise disciplined employee. Arbitrators sustained
some penalty against employees in two of every three of the 154
cases in which an employee refused to work for reasons of health
or safety. 9
The effect of this mode of analysis on the outcome of these
cases is even more severe for employees because arbitrators rou-
tinely place upon them the heaviest possible standards of proof.
Standards of proof in these cases come in three weights: objective
proof, reasonable belief, and good faith belief.2" In forty-two per-
cent of the 120 refusal to work cases where the standard of proof
could be identified, arbitrators required the employee (or the em-
18. See, e.g., National Steel Corp., 78-2 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 1 8530 (1978) (Howl-
ett, Arb.).
19. See infra Appendix (Table No. 1).
In at least 18 of the cases, the employer-imposed penalty was mitigated or vacated for
reasons unrelated to the actual existence of a safety hazard or an actual occurence of insub-
ordination, such as long service, good work or disciplinary records, or respectful attitudes.
When these decisions are excluded from our tabulations, arbitrators sustained some pen-
alty against employees in three out of every four of the 154 cases in which an employee
refused to work for health or safety reasons.
20. See infra Appendix (Tables Nos. 2 & 3).
[Vol. 34650
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ployee's union) to produce objective proof that a health or safety
hazard existed-proof which is defined as objective evidence of
abnormally dangerous conditions:21 "demonstrative, objective, or
factual evidence, ' 22 such as "scientific evidence, '23 that there was
"in fact an extremely hazardous situation,"2 beyond the "normal
hazards" involved in the disputed work.25 Examples ranged from
proof that there was in fact ice on the ceiling and a water line
freeze-up, 26 an oil spill in the work area,27 to proof that there was
hot, flying scale in the forge shop.28
Arbitral determinations of objective proof are commonly
based on independent measurements of various sorts (tests of air-
borne concentrations of asbestos,29 the results of federal or state
agency inspections,"0 geiger counter readings of radiation levels, 1
and photographs 2), personal observations of the workplace (work
area adequate and work could be performed without hindrance,s
working welders observed at length without any fogging of their
safety glasses, 4 and "nothing to suggest an unsafe neighborhood"
for telephone work where the arbitrator saw "an elementary
school, a church, a large wood products plant. . . and single fam-
ily houses which were generally well kept . . . [in] a quiet neigh-
21. See id. (Table No. 2).
22. National Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 63 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 235, 239 (1974) (Jacobs,
Arb.).
23. Morgan Eng'g Co., 77-1 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8021, at 3096 (1976) (Gibson,
Arb.).
24. Barberton Citizens Hosp. Co., 59 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 277, 282 (1972) (Marshall,
Arb.); Agrico Chem. Co., 78-1 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8013, at 3056 (1976) (Hebert,
Arb.).
25. Agrico Chem. Co., 78-i Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 1 8013 at 3056; Morgan Eng'g
Co., 77-1 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8021, at 3096 (1976) (Gibson, Arb.).
26. Electrocast Steel Foundry, Inc., 78-2 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 1 8492 (1978)
(Larkin, Arb.).
27. FMC Corp., 70 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 574 (1978) (Nigro, Arb.).
28. Phoenix Forging Co., 78-2 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 1 8511 (1978) (Dash, Arb.)
29. Mare Island Naval Shipyard, 76 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 462 (1981) (Aller, Arb.).
30. Stokley-Van Camp, Inc., 60 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 109 (1973) (Karasick, Arb.); Bo-
waters S. Paper Co., 59 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 443 (1972) (Holly, Arb.).
31. Barberton Citizens Hosp. Co., 59 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 277 (1972) (Marshall, Arb.).
32. United States Steel Corp., 63-2 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8675 (1963) (Duff,
Arb.).
33. North Am. Rockwell Corp., 70-1 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 1 8038 (1969) (Larkin,
Arb.).
34. United States Steel Corp., 69-1 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8300 (1968) (Garrett,
Arb.).
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borhood"), 5 and direct participation in the incident (an extended
drive through the plant grounds revealed that an A-frame in the
front of a truck did not obstruct the driver's vision, 36 an arbitrator
"suffered no real discomfort while in an area where sulfuric acid
fumes were present,3 7 and an arbitrator detected no fumes or
odors when he put his head into a tank containing a copper plat-
ing solution "further than necessary to perform the operation""8 ).
The "reasonable person" or "reasonable belief" standard re-
quires an employee to demonstrate a reasonable basis for believ-
ing that an abnormal and imminent danger existed:39 "the em-
ployee has the duty, not only of stating that he believes there is a
risk to his safety or health, and the reason for believing so, but he
also has the burden . . . of showing by appropriate evidence that
he had a reasonable basis for his belief."' 40 That reasonable basis
must be "more than a mere presumption" 41 of a "remote, statisti-
cal possibility"4 2 or a "frivolous, unsound, or illogical feeling. '43
The employee must establish "some colorable basis in the facts of
the work situation confronting him" that justifies a belief that it
would be unsafe "beyond the normal hazard inherent in the oper-
ation" to perform that assignment. Under this approach, arbitra-
tors determine whether "the facts and circumstances known to
the employee at the time of the incident would have caused a 'rea-
sonable man' to fear for his safety or health." 44
Although by definition "reasonable belief" would seem to re-
35. Southwestern Bell Tel., 80-1 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8309, at 4381 (1980)
(Bothwell, Arb.).
36. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 70 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 761 (1978) (Fishgold, Arb.).
37. United States Steel Corp., 71-2 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 1 8551, at 5044 (1971)
(Dybeck, Arb.).
38. ITT Blackburn Co., 65 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 852, 854 (1975) (Walsh, Arb.).
39. Western Airlines, Inc., 67 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 486 (1976) (Christopher, Arb.).
40. Laclede Gas Co., 39 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 833, 839 (1962) (Bothwell, Arb.).
41. Ozark Border Elec. Corp., 67 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 438, 441 (1976) (Maniscalco,
Arb.).
42. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 78 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 836, 842 (1982) (McAllister, Arb.).
43. Hill Acme Co., 70-2 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8774, at 5596 (1970) (Klein,
Arb.).
44. LaClede Steel Co., 71-1 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8182, at 3599 (1971) (Volz,
Arb.); see also Western Airlines, Inc., 67 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 486 (1976) (Christopher, Arb.).
If this burden is met, it will not matter if it is subsequently established that no hazard had
in fact existed. Id. It is also unnecessary to prove that an injury would have occurred if the
work order had been obeyed. Tremco Mfg. Co., 72-1 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 1 8292
(1972) (Teple, Arb.).
[Vol. 34
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quire a lighter burden of proof, most often there is only a slight
difference, if any, between what arbitrators require of employees
under the objective proof and reasonable belief standards. Arbi-
trators emphasize the factual basis, if any, for the perceived dan-
ger under both standards and the facts required to substantiate a
reasonable belief are often identical to those needed to demon-
strate objective proof. In other words, some arbitrators find a
grievant's belief reasonable only when it is supported by objective
proof of a health or safety hazard. Thus, in twenty-four percent of
the cases with identifiable standards of proof, arbitrators applying
"reasonable belief standards" required factual bases essentially in-
distinguishable from those required under the standard of objec-
tive proof. In effect, therefore, in sixty-six percent of these cases
objective proof was required. 45 Arbitrators found, for example,
that employees had reasonable grounds to believe conditions were
"abnormally and immediately dangerous" to health or safety in
situations where: welding was being done outdoors in rain, thun-
der and lightning;46 unannounced blasting shook an underground
lunch room and the miners required to eat there, tumbling lunch
and helmets to the floor;47 "strange smelling" smoke was escaping
from a compressed air line in a factory and employees, who knew
the fire department had been called, overheard a supervisor in-
structing certain workers not to strike a match or light a ciga-
rette;48 ground meat scraps gave off an offensive odor, and the
affected employee became ill, had a nosebleed and vomited;49 and
where an employee refused to work on occasionally malfunction-
ing punch press machines (which required him to place his hands
within the point of operation) after he saw that blood was still on
the floor where a fellow-worker had lost an arm the previous day
because of a machine malfunction.5 0 In approximately twenty-five
percent of these refusal to work cases, arbitrators did apply a rea-
45. See infra Appendix (Tables Nos. 2 & 3). This type of reasonable belief is identified
as "Objective Proof Termed Reasonable Belief."
46. Southern Iron & Metal Co., 83-1 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8043 (1982)
(Nicholas, Arb.).
47. Zeni-McKinney-Williams Corp., 76-2 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 11 8421 (1976)
(Sherman, Arb.).
48. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 41 Lab. Arb. (8NA) 755 (1963)
(Stouffer, Arb.).
49. Packers By-Products Co., 8 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 248 (1947) (Wardlaw, Arb.).
50. Checker Motors Corp., 61 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 33 (1973) (Daniel, Arb.).
19851 653
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sonable belief standard that required something less than objec-
tive proof to justify a refusal.51
By far both the lightest and least applied standard of proof is
that of "good faith," belief defined by arbitrators as a fear that is
"genuine, ' 5" "sincere, '"" "honest and not a subterfuge" 54
- "an
honest and sincere personal conviction that his life would be in
danger" 5 regardless of whether an unsafe or unhealthful condi-
tion actually existed. This honest conviction must pertain to a per-
ceived hazard beyond "the normal hazard attendant upon the reg-
ular duties of the job." 56 Arbitrators made reference to this
standard of proof in approximately nine percent of the cases.51
The actual use of this standard by arbitrators is so rare, how-
ever, that there was only one reported case where an employee's
good faith belief was the sole, or even the primary, basis for bar-
ring a finding of insubordination for refusing to obey a work or-
der for reasons of health or safety.58 A good faith belief is more
often used as a basis for mitigating the penalty imposed for such
an insubordination.5 9
The insubordination mode of analysis used in the refusal to
work cases, with its associated heavy burden of proof on employ-
ees, is the consequence of arbitrators' almost universal acceptance
of the value judgment that management's freedom to operate the
enterprise and direct the workforce is superior to all other rights
51. Not surprisingly, where the standard of proof was "Objective Proof" or "Objec-
tive Proof Termed Reasonable Belief," refusals to work went unpunished in only 26 out of
80 cases (32.5%). When a less stringent version of the reasonable belief standard was ap-
plied, refusals went unpunished in 16 out of 29 cases (55.2%). See infra Appendix (Tables
Nos. 2 & 3).
52. Lone Star Steel Co., 48 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1094, 1097 (1967) Uenkins, Arb.).
53. Southwestern Bell Tel., 80-1 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 1 8309 (1980) (Bothwell,
Arb.); Social Sec. Admin., 73 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 267 (1979) (Eaton, Arb.); Bunker Hill Co.,
65 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 182, 185 (1975) (Kleinsorge, Arb.).
54. IBEW Local 1393, 60 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1017, 1026 (1973) (Willingham, Arb.);
Duval Corp., 43 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 102 (1964) (Myers, Arb.).
55. United States Potash Co., 30 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1039, 1047 (1958) (Abernethy,
Arb.).
56. Id. at 1046.
57. See infra Appendix (Tables Nos. 2 & 3).
58. See Public Serv. Co., 60 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1017, 1026 (1973) (Willingham, Arb.).
59. See, e.g., Consolidated Edison Co., 61 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 607 (1973) (Turkus, Arb.);
Barberton Citizens Hosp. Co., 59 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 277 (1972) (Marshall, Arb.); Marble
Prods. Co., 40 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 247 (1963) (Marshall, Arb.); United States Potash Co., 30
Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1039 (1958) (Abernethy, Arb.).
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including workers' rights to a safe and healthful workplace. This
value judgment is rooted in conceptions of the rights of private
property, defined during an era dominated by a philosophy of
free market economics, by courts that desired to encourage indus-
trial undertakings by making the burdens on entrepreneurs as
light as possible. 60
Arbitrators see refusals to work, even for reasons of health
and safety, as dangerous threats to the management authority
they consider essential to the operation of an enterprise for profit.
For example, in upholding the discipline imposed on miners who
refused to throw a breaker switch on a shuttlecar after one miner
who touched the car received a mild electrical shock, an arbitrator
warned that "utter chaos" would be the "logical end product of
each crew member making the decision as to what is or is not un-
safe" since "no production would ever take place and the mines
would be shut down without employment.""1 Another arbitrator
foresaw "anarchy" at the workplace unless he enforced manage-
ment's right to require obedience to its orders in the face of em-
ployees' refusal to work because of smoke and dust at their work
areas.
6 2
Another arbitrator, in denying the grievance of an employee
who was discharged for refusing to work in an area that required
him to wade into water backed up around a 440 volt electricity
line, presented a somewhat different version of the management
rights value judgment: "In order for the Company to keep its bus-
iness enterprise operating in a viable manner, its employees must
be engaged in performing work. . . not. . . in creating confron-
tations."8 " This point was made even more succinctly in the Farm-
ers Chemical Company decision, echoing Harry Shulman, "[a]n in-
dustrial plant is not a debating society. Its object is production." '
Revealing analogies are used in some decisions to affirm man-
agement's paramount authority. In Richards Tank Corporation, af-
60. See W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 80, at 571-72
(5th ed. 1984).
61. Bethlehem Mines Corp., 73-2 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8594, at 5234 (1974)
(May, Arb.).
62. Bethlehem Mines Corp., 74-2 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 1 8367 (1974) (Rimer,
Arb.).
63. Dayton Tire & Rubber Co., 67 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 78, 80 (1976) (Ipavec, Arb.).




ter asserting that there could be no business and that no company
could produce anything without the right to tell a man what to do
and when to do it, the arbitrator said that if it were otherwise, it
would "be as if an army should desert its General on the field of
Battle." 5 The state, rather than the military, was the point of
comparison in another decision holding that "a member of the
industrial society" may not choose what rules to obey or disobey
"just as a citizen of the civil society may not choose what laws he
will obey and what laws he will not obey because of his own per-
sonal beliefs or reasons."66
The use of the insubordination mode of analysis, as well as
the heavy quantum of proof placed on employees, maximizes an
employer's control of employee discipline and, thereby, minimizes
employee interference with management's freedom to operate the
enterprise. This approach means that reasonable doubts about
safety and health are resolved against the employees who raise
that defense. The restraining effect on employee conduct is obvi-
ous, as one arbitrator observed: "[I]t should be clear to all em-
ployees that a justification for 'on the spot' refusal to accept a
work assignment will be difficult to establish except in a very clear
and meritorious case." '6 7 For employees, therefore, the risk of fail-
ing to meet their heavy burden of proof is high and the conse-
quences potentially disastrous since insubordination of this sort is
generally considered just cause for discharge. In the rare cases in
which arbitrators do find for employees, they routinely include in
their opinions a caveat that such success is the exception and
should not be interpreted as "encouragement" to refuse to obey a
work order.68
Other arbitral considerations also demonstrate the pre-emi-
nence of the management control value judgment in arbitrators'
65. Richards Tank Corp., 47 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 83, 85 (1966) (Welch, Arb.).
Military analogies are, however, inappropriate in health and safety cases since an em-
ployee cannot lawfully be compelled to give life or limb to his or her employer. See Hegeler
Zinc. Co., 8 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 826, 831 (1947) (Elson, Arb.).
66. International Paper Box Mach. Co., 51 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 328, 330 (1968) (Mur-
phy, Arb.).
67. St.Joseph Lead Co., 16 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 138, 145 (1951) (Hilpert, Arb.); see also
Hawaiian Tel. Co., 59 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 930 (1972) (Gilson, Arb.).
68. United States Pipe & Foundry Co., 70-1 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8282, at 3935
(1969) (Seinsheimer, Arb.); see also Tremco Mfg. Co., 72-1 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH)
8292 (1972) (Teple, Arb.); Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 29 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 538 (1957)
(Reid, Arb.).
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thinking. They cite favorably, for example, the fact that an em-
ployee had always carried out management's orders "without
question"69 and that the employee's objections to performing the
work at issue were not presented in an "arrogant" or "combative"
way7° or with "aggressive animosity"7 1 but in a "respectful man-
ner. . . [that]. . . did not subject the foreman to ridicule or em-
barrassment. '7 2 It is also important to arbitrators that the refusal
not be a planned test of managerial authority.7 3 Arbitrators gener-
ally condemn any concerted refusal to obey management's orders
even for reasons of health and safety whether or not that refusal
is justified. The seriousness of individual threats to management
authority is compounded when those individuals join together in
protest. 4
Management control is also reinforced by arbitrators who ap-
proach safety and health cases with the presumption that employ-
ees, not employers, are responsible for accidents-assuming that
the possibility of accidents would be minimized if employees
would perform their job tasks according to company instructions
and with due care.7 5 This presumption has its roots in negligence
theory: "In fact, perhaps, in most instances where an accident
does occur, the accident is caused by an employee doing some-
thing that the employee should not have done. '76 This approach,
of course, adds to the already heavy burden of proof placed upon
employees in these cases, making it even less likely that a safety
defense will be upheld.
Many arbitrators apply another presumption from the com-
69. Union Carbide Plastics Co., 34 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 504, 506 (1960) (Luskin, Arb.);
see also Ohio Edison Co., 70-2 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 1 8445 (1970) (Teple, Arb.); U.S.
Plywood-Champion Papers, Inc., 50 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 115 (1968) (Jenkins, Arb.); St. Jo-
seph Lead Co., 16 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 138 (1951) (Hilpert, Arb.).
70. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 29 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 538 (1957) (Reid, Arb.).
71. Imperial Foods, Inc., 69 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 320, 323 (1977) (Crawford, Arb.).
72. Union Carbide Plastics Co., 34 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 504, 506 (1960) (Luskin, Arb.);
see also Challenge-Cook Bros., Inc., 55 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 517 (1970); Hercules, Inc., 67-1
Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8191 (1967) (Hopson, Arb.); Goodyear Clearwater Mills, Inc., 8
Lab. Arb. (BNA) 647 (1947) (McCoy, Arb.).
73. See Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 29 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 538 (1957) (Reid, Arb.).
74. Pittston Co., 62 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1303 (1974) (Sergent, Arb.); National Dairy
Prods. Corp., 47 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 848 (1966) (Mullin, Arb.).
75. Dayton Power & Light Co., 63 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 653, 656 (1974) (Ipavec, Arb.);
see also Hess Oil & Chem. Corp., 66-3 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 1 9053 (1966) (Autrey,
Arb.).
76. Dayton Power & Light Co., 63 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 653, 656 (1974) (Ipavec, Arb.).
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mon law of torts to refusals to work for reasons of health and
safety-the assumption of risk. Under that theory, a worker who
enters employment assumes all of the ordinary risks of such em-
ployment or any other obvious extraordinary dangers involved in
that employment. Despite the fact that the states, through work-
ers' compensation acts, and the federal government, through
OSHA, have clearly rejected that theory," its continued use by
arbitrators also augments employer control and adds to the em-
ployees' burden of proof. Moreover, the presumption is not only
that an employee assumes the risk of danger in a job,78 but also
that an employee is financially compensated for doing so.7
The "assumption of risk" aspect of the management rights
value judgment on the outcomes of cases involving refusals to
work for reasons of health and safety was most pointedly ex-
pressed by the arbitrator in Elliott Company: "One is always free to
quit a job and take one which doesn't require such hardship" but
cannot refuse to perform work "if his job calls for it and then
expect to escape severe disciplinary results."80
The primacy of managerial authority in the decisional-think-
ing of labor arbitrators is also manifest in the arbitral use of pen-
alties, not only as punishments for specific refusals to work but
also as lessons designed to discourage other employees from chal-
lenging management's orders. Most obvious, of course, is the dis-
charge penalty, often imposed:
because to do otherwise would be an announcement to all of the Company's
employees that [they need not fear the loss of their jobs] on a first occasion
of insubordination . . . .It is obvious that such a situation would be chaotic
and would seriously damage, if not completely ruin, the Company's attempt
to operate its business enterprise in a profitable manner.81
Even when the arbitrator finds that an employee was justified
in refusing to obey an order for reasons of health or safety, the
company-imposed penalty is sometimes merely reduced, not abro-
gated, because "the imposition of some discipline was proper"
77. See, e.g., New York Cent. R.R. Co. v. White, 243 U.S. 188, 197-202 (1917); Na-
tional Realty & Constr. Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Rev. Comm'n, 489 F.2d 1257,
1266 n.36 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
78. See Elliott Co., 70 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1013 (1978) (Lubow, Arb.); Checker Motor
Corp., 61 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 33 (1973) (Daniel, Arb.).
79. Tenneco Chemicals, Inc., 48 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1082 (1967) (House, Arb.).
80. Elliott Co., 70 Lab. Arb. (BNA) at 1017.
81. Dayton Tire & Rubber Co., 67 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 78, 81 (1976) (Ipavec, Arb.).
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where "the record shows a refusal of an order of a foreman"
which "cannot be condoned." 2 In such decisions, the point is
made that employees should not expect to refuse orders "with im-
punity," so some substantial penalty such as a suspension without
pay "would certainly be sufficient to discourage these men or
others from lightly disregarding the Company's desires in the
future."' s
The management rights framework of analysis used by arbi-
trators in cases where employees have refused to work for reasons
of safety and health has resulted in decisions that place property
rights, and other factors such as profits, efficiency, cost-benefit
analysis, technology, management authority, and economic pro-
gress, over human rights. In a case referred to previously (the em-
ployee who became ill, had nosebleeds, and vomited while work-
ing in the midst of offensive odors and fumes from packing house
meat scraps), the arbitrator told the employee that the proper
procedure was to get sick first and then grieve:
It appears that the proper procedure should have been for the Union
committee to have insisted that the employee go onto the job assigned and
for the employee to have done so, then if he became ill as a result thereof to
have asked for assignment to some other job .... [T]he failure of the em-
ployee to do so does not justify reinstatement with back pay. 8
The discharge of another employee was upheld because she
refused to return to a fiberglass cutting job where she had devel-
oped an allergic reaction to the dust and shavings from cutting
baked fiberglass molds. As many as seventy-five percent of work-
ers in that area had developed such allergies and many of them
had quit or had been terminated. 5 The arbitrator found that the
grievant "suffered not only from irritation and itching sensations
at the points of contact, but,. . . also . . . severe secondary aller-
gic reactions, such as a rash and hives on other parts of her
82. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 29 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 538, 539-40 (1957) (Reid, Arb.);
see also Minnesota Orchestral Ass'n, 80-1 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) % 8202 (1980) (Grabb,
Arb.); Crown-Zellerbach Corp., 79-1 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 1 8069 (1978) (Nicholas,
Arb.); Imperial Foods, Inc., 69 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 320 (1977) (Crawford, Arb.); Checker
Motor Corp., 61 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 33 (1973) (Daniel, Arb.); U.S. Plywood-Champion Pa-
pers, Inc., 50 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 115 (1968) (Jenkins, Arb.).
83. United States Potash Co., 30 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1039, 1047 (1958) (Abernethy,
Arb.).
84. Packers By-Products Co., 8 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 248, 250 (1947) (Wardlaw, Arb.).
85. Health Techna Corp., 69-1 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) % 8394 (1968) (Peck, Arb.).
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body."8' He also found that these allergic reactions had "spread
even to the soles of her feet, sometimes making it difficult for her
to walk or stand after a normal day's work. 81 7 All of these symp-
toms disappeared when she was temporarily transferred to an-
other job because of a shutdown in the fiberglass area.
The arbitrator ruled that compliance with management's or-
der to return to the fiberglass work area would probably cause her
to suffer the same allergic reactions to fiberglass dust, but "no
worse than the reactions she had been willing to endure" while on
that job which, although "[u]npleasant," did not constitute "a
threat to her basic health, safety, or welfare.""" The arbitrator
concluded that a lesser penalty would serve no purpose since the
grievant "rest[ed] her entire case upon an absolute right to refuse
to comply with the job assignment made."'
In the case where an employee refused to operate an occa-
sionally malfunctioning press machine after a fellow worker lost
an arm because of the malfunction and the blood from that inci-
dent remained on the floor,90 the arbitrator stated that it was "oc-
currences of this very nature to which the Occupational Safety
and Health Act of 1970 [OSHA] was specifically directed in seek-
ing to eliminate the necessity or requirement for an operator to
place his hands or fingers within the point of operation. ' 91
Yet, in a July 1973 decision, the arbitrator found that since
this aspect of OSHA did not become effective until August 3,
1974, the company was "not obliged to provide alternate means
by which there would be an elimination of the necessity of putting
hands or fingers within the point of operation." ' The penalty im-
posed on the employee reveals the arbitrator's value priori-
ties-he did not sustain the discharge because the employee's re-
fusal to work was due to a reasonable fear with "some basis in
fact" but instead placed the employee on an unpaid leave of ab-
sence, without accumulation of seniority or benefits, from Decem-
ber 8, 1972 (the date of the refusal to work), "until such time as
86. Id. at 4347.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 4349.
89. Id. at 4348-49.
90. Checker Motors Corp., 61 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 33 (1973) (Daniel, Arb.).
91. Id.
92. Id. at 35-36.
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the Company eliminates the need for the operator to place his
hands or fingers within the point of operation" or, in any event,
not later than August 31, 1974.93
Arbitrators find other ways to uphold management authority
even in the face of contrary governmental directions. On August
29, 1974, a number of employees in the stripping room of a zinc
plant refused to continue working in a higher than usual "acid
mist" (a mixture of oxygen and hydrogen gases carrying micro-
scopic droplets of sulfuric acid) that caused sore eyes, bleeding
noses, facial burns, and difficult breathing. In January 1974, the
work area was inspected by the Idaho Inspector of Mines who rec-
ommended that the acid mists be monitored periodically, that an
approved respirator be worn, and that a plan be developed to ven-
tilate and dissipate the acid mists. That report was supplemented
by a memorandum from an industrial hygienist for the State of
Idaho stating that air samples taken in January indicated that it
was possible that some workers were being overexposed to sulfu-
ric acid. 4
The arbitrator upheld the company's suspension of these em-
ployees because their work was not "abnormally dangerous" (he
said the contract made no reference to "abnormal conditions"),
because the report of the Idaho Inspector of Mines did "not state
definitely that there is a health hazard" and the state hygienist
spoke only "of a possible overexposure to sulphuric acid."9 5
It should be noted that those employees who have followed
the Shulman scheme, obeying first and protesting their allegedly
unsafe and unhealthful working conditions later in the grievance
procedure, have not lost their jobs but have been penalized in a
substantial number of cases; arbitrators upheld the grievances of
such employees in only twenty-five of ninety-nine reported cases.96
B. Safety Rule Cases
Safety and health are clearly not the primary concern of arbi-
trators in refusal to work cases. In cases involving management's
unilateral formulation and implementation of safety rules, how-
93. Id. at 36.
94. Bunker Hill Co., 65 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 182 (1975) (Kleinsorge, Arb.).
95. Id. at 186 (emphasis in original).
96. See infra Appendix (Table No. 1).
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ever, arbitrators seem to elevate safety and health concerns to a
rank above all other matters: "Matters of safety, to prevent inju-
ries and loss of life, must always be given a paramount position. 01 7
"[S]afety is of the first importance in this industry."9 8 In phrases
never used in refusal to work opinions, arbitrators represent
safety as an "inherent obligation of the Company to protect its
employees,'' and an "inherent duty" and responsibility to em-
ployees to provide a safe place to work. 100 In the words of one
arbitrator:
One would certainly hope and trust that the paramount consideration
of both the parties to this dispute is the ultimate safety of the employees in
the plant. To say that, as an arbitrator, I should ignore this aspect of the
case is like saying that I should ignore an elephant that walked into my living
room. Because safety is of such great importance .... 10
This apparent shift in emphasis to safety is not the result of
reasoning from a different premise. The evidence shows that the
basic management authority value orientation of arbitrators has
not changed. The primacy of safety and health in these decisions
is not inconsistent with its subordinate position in refusal to work
cases because its ranking in the priorities of labor arbitrators de-
pends upon one consistent, controlling factor: management rights.
In the refusal to work cases, management's authority to override
employee health and safety concerns is being challenged by em-
ployees. [I]n safety rule cases, however, management's authority
to determine and implement safety and health rules is being as-
serted by management. As we discuss in our conclusion, we cer-
tainly support an approach in safety rule cases that resolves doubts
in favor of safety or health when there is evidence of a threat to
safety or health. It is disturbing, however, that for most arbitra-
tors, safety and health become paramount only when management
uses them as justification for management's exercise of authority
in establishing and enforcing safety rules.
97. Southern Ohio Coal Co., 76-2 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 1 8608, at 7041 (1976)
(Ipavec, Arb.).
98. Arkansas Power & Light Co., 70-1 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8122, at 3432
(1969) (Rohman, Arb.).
99. Alan Wood Steel Co., 38 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 418, 419 (1961) (Horvitz, Arb.); see also
Reynolds Metals Co., 77-1 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 1 8291, at 4257 (1977) (Daniel, Arb.).
100. Houdaille Indus., Inc., 62 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 11 (1974) (Markowitz, Arb.); see also
United Parcel Serv., 69-1 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 11 8228 (1968) (Turkus, Arb.).
101. Glen-Gary Corp., 80 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 921, 923 (1983) (Gates, Arb.).
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Some arbitrators assert flatly that "it is a basic management
right to formulate reasonable safety rules. ' 10 2 The "ultimate au-
thority" for rule-making "does reside with the Employer" and
even the existence of a joint union-management safety committee
does not constitute a waiver of the employer's authority "to issue
whatever rules are necessary to insure a safe operation. '10 3 Others
assert that "[s]afety is simply sound business as millions of Man-
Days are lost each year due to industrial accidents,"'" "a bad
safety record would . . . adversely affect the Company's ability to
attract and maintain new employees [who] would tend to avoid a
plant with a bad safety record,"105 the production services of a
valuable employee are lost,106 "[t]he tremendous increase in the
cost of workmen's compensation and group health insurance"
make safety rules essential,1 07 and poor safety records "bring
down upon the company the safety enforcement agencies of the
State and Federal governments."10 8
Influenced by the management rights value judgment, arbi-
trators place only the lightest burden on employers to show that
their safety and health rules are reasonable. There is, in fact, an
arbitral presumption that any rule designed to protect employees
from injury is reasonable: "Almost every company in any line of
manufacturing business attempts to make every rule and regula-
tion that is possible which will be for the benefit of the employee
and as a result accidents . . . have been reduced materially. 1 09
This presumption, is so strong that it extends to situations
where an employer has not demonstrated, with any substantial ev-
102. Lear Siegler, Inc., 76 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 579, 581 (1981) (Kaufman, Arb.); see also
Babcock & Wilcox Co., 59 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 72 (1972) (Nicholas, Arb.).
103. Alan Wood Steel Co., 38 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 418, 419 (1961) (Horvitz, Arb.). Ac-
cording to Horvitz, "The union cannot be given, nor should it desire, a veto power over
. . . [safety rules]." Id. at 419. See also Glen-Gary Corp., 80 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 921 (1983)
(Gates, Arb.).
104. Nipak, Inc., 69-2 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) % 8813, at 5738 (1969) (Prewett,
Arb.).
105. American Smelting & Ref. Co., 69 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 824, 826 (1977) (Hutcheson,
Arb.).
106. Krey Packing Co., 73-2 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) % 8528, at 4969 (1972) (Carnes,
Arb.).
107. Chemetco, 78-2 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8448, at 5092 (1978) (Gibson, Arb.).
108. American Smelting & Ref. Co., 69 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 824, 826 (1977) (Hutcheson,
Arb.); see also Glen-Gary Corp., 80 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 921 (1983) (Gates, Arb.).




idence, that a particular health or safety rule is necessary. One
arbitrator upheld an airline's rule requiring its pilots to be bear-
dless because of an alleged interference with the fit of a protective
breathing mask, even though available research was inconclusive
and the other available evidence was only "suggestive of risk." 110
The arbitrator was satisfied, however, that this was enough to
stir disturbing doubts whether one would want to be on board an aircraft
with a bearded crew-member at the controls in a sudden onslaught of a life-
threatening emergency experience which required swift and sure mask pro-
tection to surmount an oxygen crisis in the cockpit.'11
In the opinion of the arbitrator, the company did "not have to
show more than that the data that do exist point to unsafety," par-
ticularly when the "legal implications" portend "devastating liabil-
ity" to an unheedful employer. 112
In Olin Corporation,1 the arbitrator upheld the company's
imposition of a rule which disqualified all female employees of
child-bearing age (i.e., ages 18-50) from bidding on jobs where
they would be exposed to lead. Although this rule was more re-
strictive than the OSHA regulations then in effect, the arbitrator
ruled that it was "not. . .unreasonable" for the company to im-
plement lead exposure standards more stringent than OSHA's de-
spite "the medical difficulty of determining the precise level at
which lead exposure becomes a health hazard to employees, let
alone the resulting effects on pregnancies of such exposure. 1 1 4
These doubts were resolved in favor of safety-"[ilf the Arbitra-
tor were to judge the Company's medical evaluations and conclu-
sions to be overly cautious and unnecessary, he could be
joepardizing [sic] the future health and safety of the Company's
employees"-especially when "it is the Company, not OSHA,
which bears the financial responsibility for occupational damage
to employee health."11 5 Contrast that approach with the burden
put on employees in refusal to work cases to establish with objec-
tive proof that working conditions were in fact unsafe or
unhealthful.
110. Pacific Southwest Airlines, 77 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 320, 329 (1981) (Jones, Arb.).
111. Id. at 328.
112. Id. (emphasis added).
113. Olin Corp., 73 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 291 (1979) (Knudson, Arb.).
114. Id. at 295.
115. Id.
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Arbitrators also facilitate the exercise of management's au-
thority to formulate and implement safety rules by not requiring
an employer to justify a rule with proof of prior injuries or previ-
ous health or safety problems: "the Company doesn't have to wait
until someone has suffered a head injury before it can require
wearing ['bump'] hats;"'"" "[t]he Company need not confine its
adoption of safety rules to correcting situations which have re-
sulted in injury. 12 7 This approach also sharply contrasts with the
way arbitrators treat the absence of incidents of injury or illness in
refusal to work cases where the fact that no other employee who
agreed to perform the disputed work was injured,"" or the fact
that over a longer period of time there were few or no accidents
or apparent ill health effects, is usually considered persuasive evi-
dence that the work is safe.1 9 Given this arbitral approach and
reasoning, employees won only twenty-three percent of the safety
rule cases-44 of 191 reported decisions.'2 0
C. Crew Size Reduction Cases
In these cases, adherence by arbitrators to the underlying
value judgment of management's right to manage again appears
clearly and forcibly, but without any ostensible ranking of safety
first, in their opinions concerning employers' crew size determina-
tions. In this line of cases, where a union claims that a reduction
in the size of a work crew jeopardizes safety or that a work crew
should be increased for safety reasons, the primacy of manage-
ment authority is portrayed by arbitrators as essential to the pur-
suit of efficiency. Efficiency is viewed by arbitrators as one of the
most important and fundamental rights of management: "It
116. Castleberry's Food Co., 62 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1267, 1268 (1974) (King, Arb.).
117. Pennwalt Corp., 65 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 751, 753 (1975) (Blumrosen, Arb.).
118. See Rostone Corp., 78-2 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8299 (1978) (Biddinger,
Arb.); Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 59 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 375 (1972) (Silver, Arb.); Hess
Oil & Chem. Corp., 66-3 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 2 9053 (1966) (Autrey, Arb.); R. Mun-
roe & Sons Mfg. Corp., 40 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1300 (1963) (Duff, Arb.); Allied Chem. & Dye
Corp., 31 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 699 (1958) (McIntosh, Arb.).
119. See Spang Indus., Inc., 82-1 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 2 8205 (1982) (Hewitt,
Arb.); Southwestern Bell Tel., 80-1 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 2 8309 (1980) (Bothwell,
Arb.); Consolidated Edison Co., 71 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 238 (1978) (Kelly, Arb.); Erie Mining
Co., 46 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 43 (1965) (Dworkin, Arb.); National Aluminum Co., 36 Lab. Arb.
(BNA) 78 (1960) (Stouffer, Arb.).
120. See infra Appendix (Table No. 1).
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hardly needs to be added that the Company does have the inher-
ent residual Management power and authority to operate the
plant as efficiently as it can . . ,,.I' Grievances were upheld in
only eighteen percent of these cases-eleven of sixty-two cases.1 2
2
The power and influence of this value judgment is demon-
strated not only by the number of times it is repeated in crew size
opinions but also by the unusual interpretations it inspires. One
arbitrator decided, for example, that since there was no contrac-
tual language concerning the "maintenance of crew size in the in-
terest of safety" he would be improperly adding to the contract by
"making a pronouncement on this subject." '123 In McGraw Edison
Company, where there was bilaterally negotiated contractual lan-
guage requiring the company to make reasonable provisions for
the in-plant safety and health of its employees, the arbitrator
ruled that it was the company's right to decide unilaterally what
"reasonable provisions" meant. 124
Once again the burden of proof is placed on the employees
and their union. In Erie Mining Company, for example, even after
allowing that "it might be reasoned" that an employer had a spe-
cific duty to "provide (1) a safe place to work; (2) safe machinery
tools, and equipment; (3) competent fellow employees; (4) instruc-
tions and . . . warnings as to the dangers involved; and (5) rules
for the conduct of the work," the arbitrator placed the burden
not on the party with the duty to provide the safe workplace, but
on the union "to establish the violation by the company of the
particular duty upon which it [the union] hinges its case. "125
The union and employees must prove that a reduction in
crew size will in fact result in an unsafe condition or that an addi-
tional crew member would substantially reduce risks. The union
must show that management "created a hazardous condition"1 2
in its determination of crew size or, as one arbitrator put it in a
gas furnace operation case, the union must be able "to produce
. . . evidence of actual explosion or serious fire which would en-
121. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 50 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 871, 874 (1968) (Klamon, Arb.).
122. See infra Appendix (Table No. I).
123. Cynthetex Corp., 72-2 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 1 8519 (1972) (Davis, Arb.).
124. McGraw-Edison Co., 79-1 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 1 8262 (1979) (Seinsheimer,
Arb.). The contract, it should be noted, actually read "responsible provisions."
125. Erie Mining Co., 36 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 902, 912 (1961) (Dworkin, Arb.).
126. Sparta Ceramics Co., 62-1 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 1 8034 (1961) (Nichols,
Arb.).
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danger operators who used reasonable caution and followed safety
procedures. 1 2 7 The union must also prove "abnormal" hazards
beyond those "inherent in the normal operation" of the job. 2
The arbitrator's decision in that same furnace operation case
demonstrates the effect of the interaction between the objective
proof standard and arbitral reverence for efficiency: "it is not rea-
sonable to ask a Company to increase their operating costs, and
ultimately the price of their products to the public, in order to
achieve a minimal hypothetical reduction in possible risk to a few em-
ployees. 1129 In Illinois Department of Personnel, the arbitrator ac-
knowledged that the employees who administered public assis-
tance were sincere in fearing for their safety but ruled that the
employer was not obliged to reinstitute security guard protection
for those employees. The union had not carried out its burden of
proof because, after "scanning the occupational field," the arbi-
trator doubted that the public aid office was unique among "a
great number of vocations [that] expose individuals to verbal
abuse and occasionally to physical threats or attack." ' Further-
more, the remedy sought by the union offended his sense of effi-
ciency: "The Arbitrator finds it a bit repulsive to visualize a secur-
ity guard with nothing to do but make an appearance and be
available as a third party intermediary on occasion."1 1
In crew sizes cases, therefore, doubts about safety are subor-
dinated to concerns about efficiency and technological change.
Unlike arbitrators' pronouncements in safety rule cases about the
pre-eminence of safety and health, their opinions in crew size
cases routinely contain disclaimers about management's obliga-
tions. These statements reflect the underlying management rights
value judgment: "The problem is not what is the safest possible
method to be installed;" 132 "[w]hile the company is obligated to
127. Lever Bros. Co., 64 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 503, 506 (1975) (Block, Arb.) (emphasis in
original).
128. Erie Mining Co., 36 Lab. Arb. (BNA) at 908-09; see also Newport Steel Corp., 82-
2 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8342 (1982) (Murphy, Arb.); General Am. Transp. Corp., 55
Lab. Arb. (BNA) 843 (1970) (Lehoczky, Arb.); Hanna Ore Mining Co., 37 Lab. Arb.
(BNA) 1019 (1961) (Sembower, Arb.).
129. Lever Bros. Co., 64 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 503, 507 (1975) (Block, Arb.) (emphasis in
original).
130. Illinois Dep't of Personnel, 74 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 306, 311 (1980) (Belcher, Arb.).
131. Id. n.4.
132. Union Carbide Metals Co., 37 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 501, 502 (1961) (Murphy, Arb.).
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exercise a high degree of responsibility with reference to the
safety of its personnel, it is not an absolute insurer of the safety of
its employees."133 The opinions present a more relaxed and less
urgent attitude toward safety:
Every one of us takes a considerable number of risks every day, off the job as
well as on the job. We risk injury and death when we drive an automobile,
ride an airplane or train, cross a street as a pedestrian, or operate power
tools. Yet we must take these risks if we are to function as normal people in
a modern society.'"
Contrary to their approach to safety rule cases, arbitrators
consider the absence of on-the-job accidents in crew size cases to
be persuasive proof that there is no safety problem. That ap-
proach, of course, is also used in refusal to work cases, showing
the underlying management rights value judgment at work.1 85
Acceptance of efficiency as the paramount good also reflects
the arbitral presumption that management's motives in these cases
are of the highest order ("[s]urely the Company is in a competi-
tive business, but the Arbitrator does not believe that it would sac-
rifice the safety of its employees for the purpose of saving a few
dollars") 3 6 and an arbitral suspicion that a union's safety claim is
only a cover for some ulterior motive, such as attempting to retain
a job, to get extra employees assigned, to recoup lost earnings for
employees (crews on incentive plans, for example) or to challenge
the wisdom of management's action in some other way.1 37
D. Disease and Disability Cases
In the words of one arbitrator, a company's right to termi-
nate the employment of a person who cannot perform assigned
133. Erie Mining Co., 36 Lab. Arb. (BNA) at 909.
134. Lever Bros. Co., 64 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 503, 507 (1975) (Block, Arb.).
135. See Dravco Corp., 76 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 903 (1981) (Duff, Arb.); Mesta Mach. Co.,
79-1 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8283 (1979) (Kates, Arb.); Nipak, Inc., 69-2 Lab. Arb.
Awards (CCH) 1 8813 (1969) (Prewett, Arb.); Phoenix Steel Corp., 66-3 Lab. Arb. Awards
(CCH) 9011 (1966) (Crawford, Arb.); American Cyanamid Co., 65-1 Lab. Arb. Awards
(CCH) 8071 (1965) (Black, Arb.).
136. Hooker Chem. Corp., 71-1 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8325, at 3783 (1971) (Op-
penheim, Arb.).
137. See Agrico Chem. Co., 78-1 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 1 8013 (1976) (Hebert,
Arb.); General Am. Transp. Corp., 55 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 843 (1970) (Lehoczky, Arb.); Hud-
son Pulp & Paper Corp., 53 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 637 (1969) (King, Arb.); Jones & Laughlin
Steel Corp., 43 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 583 (1964) (Duff, Arb.).
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job duties because of a physical disability is "universally recog-
nized."18 Arbitrators in these "disability and disease" cases, as in
safety rule cases, express an overriding concern for safety and
health and place responsibility on employers to protect the af-
fected employee and that employee's coworkers from accidents,
injuries, or illnesses. What comes through the words once again,
however, is the primacy of the management rights value judg-
ment; that is, arbitrators give paramount importance to safety and
health considerations only when they are consistent with manage-
ment's needs.1 "9
Over the years, arbitrators have consistently considered a
physical disability to be just cause for discharge when it constitutes
a hazard to the employee or fellow employees-"harsh as such
action may be."' 140 It is actually more than a mere cause for dis-
charge since arbitrators agree that an employer has an obligation
not to jeopardize the safety of other employees by retaining one
afflicted with a disability.1 41
These cases comprise a catalogue of human pain and disor-
ders: coronary problems, epilepsy, Parkinson's disease, silicosis, al-
lergies, back pain, vision deficiencies, fainting, leg amputations,
polio, asthma, scabies, mental problems, Paget's disease, emphy-
sema, diabetes, and Viet Nam induced "delayed stress syndrome."
Arbitrators express remorse at being compelled to decide against
138. Kennecott Copper Corp., 45 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 616, 620 (1965) (Gorsuch, Arb.).
139. Prominent among these needs are financial considerations, such as increases in
the cost of workmen's compensation and other insurance liabilities borne by employers.
One arbitrator explained:
The temptation for an employer to divest himself of a clearly physically dis-
abled employee is, to be candid about it, a real one considering the money costs
involved or that may be involved in the future .... [But] an employer is not
the guarantor of a job for life for an employee unfortunately suffering with a
work connected disability.
Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 53 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 762, 767 (1969) (Ryder, Arb.); see also
Braniff Airways, Inc., 78-2 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8468 (1978) (Bowers, Arb.); Singer
Mfg. Co., 61-3 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8747 (1961) (Cahn, Arb.).
140. Koppers Co., 81-2 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8602, at 5629 (1981) (Edes, Arb.);
see also Mead Corp., 81 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1000 (1983) (Heinsz, Arb.); Mobil Oil Corp., 81
Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1090 (1983) (Taylor, Arb.); Cowan Stone Co., 76-2 Lab. Arb. Awards
(CCH) 8483 (1976) (Williams, Arb.); Auer Register Co., 62 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 235 (1974)
(Perry, Arb.); Health Techna Corp., 69-1 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8394 (1968) (Peck,
Arb.); Stouffer Chem. Co., 63-1 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) % 8140 (1963) (Hale, Arb.); Re-
public Steel Corp., 25 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 239 (1955) (Platt, Arb.).
141. See Bethlehem Steel Co., 41 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 211 (1963) (Barrett, Arb.); United
States Steel Corp., 64-1 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8026 (1963) (Tripp, Arb.).
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grievants experiencing these dysfunctions, 42 but that remorse
gives way to their sense of personal responsibility for the safety
and health of these grievants: "[I]f the [work] restriction were
lifted and the grievant as a result suffered another attack or this
condition became aggravated, I would blame only myself. ' 143 This
sense of personal responsibility is undetectable in the refusal to
work and the crew size cases.
In a typical case, Arketex Ceramic Corporation, the arbitrator
sustained the discharge of an employee who had silicosis because
it Was the employer's contractual obligation to correct any condi-
tion that endangered an employee's health or safety and the
worker's health would have been endangered if he returned to
work "in the dust-filled air that is especially dangerous to him. 144
The arbitrator also considered the matter of a threatened insur-
ance premium increase:
One way of looking at this is that the Company has the right to run its oper-
ation in the most economical manner it can .... [T]his is a responsibility
not only to the owners but to all the employees as well. There seems to be
little question that returning this man to Yard work could cause an increase
in the insurance rate or an increase in the cost of operation. I can see little
difference in this than if it could have been said that this man could only
work at half the level of the other men and, therefore, two men would be
needed instead of one and, as a result, costs would have been increased.
Under such a circumstance, there would be little question that the employee
would be unsatisfactory and the Company, under this Contract, would not
only have the right but the duty to protect itself and its employees by termi-
nating this employee.145
The arbitrator also indicated some annoyance with the victim
of silicosis because of his refusal "to accept and understand the
danger to his health has placed everyone concerned with this case
in a most difficult and painful position":
If they agree with his demand to be put back into the Yard, they are...
sentencing him to further impairment of his health, or even to shortening
142. See Cominco Am. Inc., 69-2 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) % 8728 (1969) (Belcher,
Arb.); Reynolds Metals Co., 43 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 734 (1964) (Boles, Arb.); General Mills,
Inc., 24 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 290 (1955) (Abernethy, Arb.).
143. Singer Mfg. Co., 61-3 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 1 8747, at 6429 (1961) (Cahn,
Arb.); see also New Jersey Turnpike Auth., 71-2 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8637 (1971)
(Rosenberg, Arb.).
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his life. And on the other hand, if they disagree with him, they are placed in
the position of desiring the end of his working life at Arketex. For my part,
I have no intention of ruling in a manner that would hasten his death or
further impair his health.""'
Safety and health first is the stated theme of these decisions:
"Just as an employer should not be expected to direct an em-
ployee to work under unsafe conditions, the employer should not
be expected to assign a person to duties which would be detrimen-
tal to his health, or hazardous to other persons. ' 147 One arbitra-
tor put it most succinctly: "It is better, in my view, that manage-
ment err on the side of safety rather, than otherwise. ' 148
Arbitrators readily allow employers to "err on the side of safety"
in safety rule and disability and disease cases, but provide no such
benefit of the doubt to employees in refusal to work and crew size
cases.
In Arandell Corporation, for example, the arbitrator stated
that, whereas a heavy burden of proof lies upon management in
disciplinary cases, no such heavy burden applies when the case is
nondisciplinary-"such as releases due to bad health." 4" To say
merely that arbitrators place a lesser burden of proof on employ-
ers in health and safety cases involving employee disabilities than
they place on employees in refusal to work for reasons of health
or safety cases would be a seriously misleading understatement. In
Arandell, the employer terminated the employment of a man who
had been under the care of a psychiatrist after his coworkers
signed what the arbitrator called a "worried message of warning
to management: 'We the employees of Arandell Corporation feel
for the best interest of C-that he be relieved of his duties in the
Press Department because of apparent health problems !' "10 The
arbitrator noted that the company "had no part in this document,
except to suggest the insertion of the word 'apparent.'" In the
opinion of the arbitrator, the observations of the worker's fellow
employees "standing alone fully established a valid and forceful
reason for the employee's removal" and the burden was then on
146. Id. at 1176-77.
147. Cominco Am. Inc., 69-2 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8728, at 5483 (1969)
(Belcher, Arb.).
148. Fram Corp., 82-1 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8265, at 4203 (1982) (Kates, Arb.).
149. Arandell Corp., 56 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 832, 884 (1971) (Hazelwood, Arb.).
150. Id. at 833.
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the discharged employee to present "strong medical evidence" of
his "normalcy." The arbitrator does not say why the company was
not obliged to present "strong medical evidence" of the em-
ployee's abnormalcy before terminating his employment.151
After the employee did give the company a report from his
psychiatrist which "contradicted the non-professional suspicions of
the co-workers," the employer reinstated the man but denied him
seven months back pay. The arbitrator upheld the denial of back
pay because the employer had "reasonable grounds . . . for suspi-
don" and "Management, in its role of protector of personnel and
property, should not gamble with his retention when a worker
carries on suspiciously and has a past history of mental
difficulty. '15 2
The arbitrator in Caterpillar Tractor Company53 sustained the
demotion of an automotive serviceman, who had some residual
handicap to his right arm and leg due to childhood polio, despite
the fact that in his five months on that job he had caused no in-
jury to himself or others. The arbitrator acknowledged that the
company's conclusion that the grievant lacked the physical
strength and dexterity to perform the job was based "primarily
[on] opinion evidence" resulting from observations of the
employee.""
The company's observations were "limited in frequency and
duration" and "standing alone," the arbitrator concluded, were
"undoubtedly . . . too weak to justify the Company's action."
These company observations were "fortified," however, by "two
members of the Union's Safety Committee" neither of whom tes-
tified at the hearing of this case. Rather than requiring the com-
pany to produce these witnesses to provide testimony to substanti-
ate the company's decision to demote, the arbitrator found that
the Union's failure to call one of these safety committeemen to
testify raised "an inference that his testimony would have been
unfavorable to [the] Grievant's cause and, therefore, lends sup-
port to the Company's evidence . . . ,,.55
151. Id.
152. Id. at 834 (emphasis in original).
153. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 78-2 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 1 8409 (1978) (Roberts,
Arb.).
154. Id. at 4920.
155. Id. at 4921.
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In the opinion of the arbitrator, the company's "evidence"
was also buttressed by the complaints of two of the grievant's fel-
low employees who also did not appear at the hearing to testify.
The arbitrator admitted that this was hearsay evidence but added
that there was "nothing in the record . . . contradictory to this
fact [i.e., the complaints]." He concluded that since there was "an
unreasonable risk of injury" the employer "should not wait until
some irreparable harm has occurred prior to taking corrective
and remedial action. 15 6
In other cases, arbitrators, without any medical evidence to
support a company's position, find the "subjective conviction[s]"
of grievants "insufficient to rebut the opinions of Company wit-
nesses intimately familiar with the operations and the hazards
thereof. . .. -157 In Koppers Company, Inc., the arbitrator upheld
the discharge of an employee suffering from epilepsy despite the
fact that the grievant "was never given full diagnostic testing for
epilepsy" by either a company doctor or his own physician.1 8
There was some evidence that the grievant had "passed out"
while leaving a ball game four years before his discharge and that
his doctor had prescribed medication "typically associated with
treatment for epilepsy."159 He had never experienced any such
problems on the job.
According to the arbitrator, the company had no obligation
"to seek further independent proof of the Grievant's condition"
because, if the diagnosis was "not well founded," any loss suffered
by the grievant was a matter between him and his doctor.160 This
arbitrator's concluding remarks confirm the speculative nature of
the basis for termination, the fact that such doubts are resolved
against employees, ignorance concerning the nature of epilepsy
and the fact that it can be controlled, and the primacy of manage-
ment rights:
It is true, of course, that the Grievant has not suffered any seizures in the
period of his employment. The fact remains that if, indeed, he is epileptic,
156. Id.
157. Cowan Stone Co., 76-2 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 1 8483, at 6568-69 (1976) (Wil-
liams, Arb.) (emphasis added); see also Kenner Prods. Co., 78-1 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 1
8229 (1978) (Bums, Arb.).
158. Koppers Co., 81-2 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 1 8602, at 5629 (1981) (Edes, Arb.).
159. Id. at 5630.
160. Id.
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such seizure may come at any time and without prior notice. Nor can my
decision in this case be affected by the assertion of the Union that other
employees in the plant who have had heart disease, diabetes, and high blood
pressure and have been required to take medication for such conditions
have not been discharged by the Company. No evidence was adduced, how-
ever, to show that such cases provided safety risks comparable to that in the
case of this Grievant.1 ft
Even when medical evidence is available to arbitrators it is
most often in the form of written reports rather than personal
testimony subject to cross examination. Moreover, it is frequently
conflicting-"add[ing] up to a difficult and sobering responsibility
for one without a medical background"16 2 which, unfortunately,
reduces arbitrators to reading medical dictionaries and other
books for confirmation of one report or another. 16 3 Given the al-
ready established fact that doubts in these cases are going to be
resolved in favor of management, confusion concerning a griev-
ant's physical or mental condition can only be detrimental to em-
ployees and their unions-particularly when arbitrators, con-
fronted with conflicting expert medical testimony, commonly
uphold an employer's right to rely on its own medical advisors.1'
Arbitrators upheld employee grievances in only six of fifty-eight
reported cases involving disease and disability issues-slightly
more than ten percent.6 5
II. IGNORING ALTERNATIVE VALUE JUDGMENTS: ARBITRATION AND
THE LAW
Value judgments underlie not only arbitration decisions but
also statutory policies and the decisions of judges interpreting and
applying those statutory policies. This Section is not intended to
be an in-depth legal analysis of statutory or judicial standards. Al-
though the issue of whether arbitrators should apply external law
in their decisions has been the subject of extensive debate,166 this
161. Id.
162. Reynolds Metals Co., 43 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 734, 737 (1964) (Boles, Arb.).
163. See Cominco Am. Inc., 69-2 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8728 (1969) (Belcher,
Arb.); Stauffer Chem. Co., 43 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1225 (1965) (Black, Arb.).
164. See Mobil Oil Corp., 81 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1090 (1983) (Taylor, Arb.); Cominco
Am. Inc., 69-2 Lab. Arb. Awards. (CCH) 8728 (1969) (Belcher, Arb.); Hughes Aircraft
Co., 49 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 535 (1967) (Doyle, Arb.).
165. See infra Appendix (Table No. 1).
166. Many of the arguments framing the current debate about the role of external law
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Section's purpose is not to urge the application of these statutory
and judicial standards. This Section's primary purpose, rather, is
to underscore the existence of public policy, in the form of alter-
native statutory and judicial value judgments and the varying ap-
proaches taken by courts that are sometimes compatible but often
sharply contrast with those applied by labor arbitrators in health
and safety cases.1 67
The major statute dealing with on-the-job health and safety
among members of the arbitration community were set out in two speeches made almost
20 years ago at an annual meeting of the National Academy of Arbitrators. Compare Melt-
zer, Ruminations About Ideology, Law, and Labor Arbitration, 20 NAT'L ACAD. OF ARBS. PRoC. 1
(1967) with Howlett, The Arbitrator, the N.L.R.B., and the Courts, 20 NAT'L ACAD. OF ARBS.
PROC. 67 (1967).
Arbitrators, academics and arbitrators who are themselves academics have continued
the debate over external law, both within and without the National Academy of Arbitra-
tors. See, e.g., Feller, The Coming End of Arbitration's Golden Age, 29 NAT'L ACAD. OF ARS.
PRoC. 97 (1976); The Impact of External Law Upon Labor Arbitration in THE FUTURE OF LABOR
ARBITRATION IN AMERiCA 83 (Correge, Hughes & Stone eds. 1976); Howlett, The Role of Law
in Arbitration: A Reprise, 21 NAT'L ACAD. OF ARs. PROC 64 (1968); Jones, The Role of Arbitra-
tion in State and National Labor Policy, 24 NAT'L ACAD. OF ARES. PRoC. 42 (1971); McKelvey,
Sex and the Single Arbitrator, 24 INDUS. & LAB. REL REV. 335 (1971); Meltzer, The Role of Law
in Arbitration: A Rejoinder, 21 NAT'L ACAD. OF ARBs. PRor- 58 (1968); Mittenthal, The Role of
Law in Arbitration, 21 NAT'L ACAD. OF ARs. 42 (1968); Morris, Comment, 24 NAT'L ACAD. OF
AaBs. PRor- 65 (1971); Platt, The Relationship Between Arbitration and Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 3 GA. L. REV. 398 (1969); Sovern, When Should Arbitrators Follow Federal
Law?, 23 NAT'L ACAD. OF ARBs. PRoc. 29 (1970); St. Antoine, Discussion, 21 NAT'L ACAD. OF
ARES. PRoC 75 (1968). See also Christensen, PrivateJudges-Public Rights: The Role of Arbitra-
tion in the Enforcement of the National Labor Relations Act in THE FUTURE OF LABOR ARBITRA-
TION IN AMERICA 49 (Correge, Hughes & Stone eds. 1976).
The Supreme Court and the National Labor Relations Board have also dealt with the
relationship between arbitrators and the law in the context of judicial and Board deference
to arbitration. See, e.g., W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local 759, URW, 461 U.S. 757 (1983); Bar-
rentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728 (1981); Alexander v. Gardner-
Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974); United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp.,
363 U.S. 593 (1960); Olin Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. 573 (1984); United Technologies Corp.,
268 N.L.R.B. 557 (1984); Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 N.L.R.B. 837 (1971); Spielberg
Mfg. Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 1080 (1955). See also generally Comment, Unsuccessful Employee
Arbitrants Bring Wrongful Discharge Claims in State Court: The Accomodation of Public and Pri-
vate Adjudication, 35 BUFFALO L. REv. (1986) (forthcoming).
167. For an examination of the role of value judgments in labor law, see J. ATLESON,
supra note 1. For a detailed examination of the legal standards developed in this Section,
see G. NOTHSTEIN, THE LAW OF OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH (1981); Ashford & Katz,
Unsafe Working Conditions: Employee Rights Under the Labor Management Relations Act and the
Occupational Safety & Health Act, 52 NOTRE DAME LAW. 802 (1977); Atleson, Threats to
Health and Safety: Employee Self-Help Under the NLRA, 59 MINN. L. REv. 647 (1975); Note,
Refusals of Hazardous Work Assignments: A Proposal for a Uniform Standard, 81 COLUM. L. Ruv.
544 (1981).
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is, of course, the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA)."'8
The fundamental purpose of that law is stated in its preamble: "to
assure so far as possible every working man and woman in the
Nation safe and healthful working conditions and to preserve our
human resources." 1 9 The legislative history of OSHA clearly af-
firms that the primary goal of the Act is worker safety and health,
not management productivity or control: "We are talking about
people's lives, not the indifference of some cost accountants. We
are talking about assuring the men and women who work in our
plants and factories that they will go home after a day's work with
their bodies intact. '17 0
OSHA places the primary burden of creating safe and health-
ful working conditions on employers. An employer's obligation is
two-fold: to provide a workplace free from recognized hazards
causing or likely to cause worker death or serious physical harm;
and, to comply with all OSHA standards . 71 The employee's sole
obligation is to comply with all applicable OSHA standards, rules,
regulations, and orders.172 Commentators have noted that OSHA
is "one of the most far-reaching pieces of remedial social legisla-
tion ever enacted by the United States Congress," ' for it is not
merely a set of safety codes "but rather extensive legislation in-
tended to alter employer and employee rights and obligations re-
garding broad health and safety issues. 174
Few arbitrators refer to OSHA in their opinions.17 5 Most of
those arbitrators who do, use OSHA not to emphasize workers'
rights but to strengthen the case for management's rights. Arbi-
168. Occupational Safety & Health Act (OSHA) of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84 Stat.
1590 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5, 15, 18, 29, 42 & 49 U.S.C.).
169. 29 U.S.C. § 651(b) (1982).
170. Whirlpool Corp. v. Marshall, 445 U.S. 1, 11-12 n.16 (1980) (quoting 116 CONG,
RE. 37,625 (1970) (statement of Sen. Yarborough).
171. 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(1), (2) (1982).
172. 29 U.S.C. § 654(b) (1982).
173. G. NOTSTIMN, supra note 161, at 1.
174. Ashford & Katz, supra note 161, at 802.
175. Of the 743 cases read for this study, including the 159 miscellaneous cases ulti-
mately eliminated from our calculations, see supra note 4, only 71 of the 460 post-OSHA
cases (15.4%) even mentioned the Act. Most of the 71 arbitrators did little more than note
the existence of OSHA, and only a handful of these specifically relied on its provisions in
reaching their decisions.
Only 126 of the 743 cases (17.0%) noted the existence of any kind of "external" health
and safety law (state or federal) and as with OSHA, see supra note 4, arbitrators usually
only mentioned such law only in passing, rarely relying upon it for their decisions.
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trators mention OSHA most often in safety rule cases, emphasiz-
ing that management must be allowed wide latitude to promulgate
safety rules because it is under pressure from OSHA, that OSHA
is "looking over [the company's] shoulder," or that "the company
may be subject to severe liability" if it does not comply with
OSHA. e17
The arbitral management rights orientation is so strong that
it has led to claims by some arbitrators that Congress must have
been primarily concerned with management rights when it en-
acted OSHA:
[S]hould there be any doubt that the Company lacked such a right [to make
safety rules] it can be completely removed when note is given to the obliga-
tions imposed on the Company by the Federal Government with the enact-
ment of [OSHA]. In setting forth the standards to assure safe and healthful
working conditions for working men and women, the Congress of the
United States has placed limitations on Company employers subject to the
act. The industrial concern of today must take proper steps to bring about a
reduction of on the job accidents and the setting and causes for same. Cer-
tainly, it is only true to conclude that Congress fully recognized and affirmed man-
agements' rights to make reasonable and proper rules for the welfare of the
worker.1"
In these safety rule cases, arbitrators acknowledge some man-
agement obligation under OSHA to provide a safe and healthful
workplace. There is virtually no discussion in refusal to work cases
of any management obligation under OSHA. While arbitrators'
stated standards of proof (i.e., good faith, reasonableness or objec-
tive proof) often bear resemblance to the standard of proof re-
quired in OSHA refusal cases,178 arbitrators' reliance upon objec-
176. Phoenix Forging Co., 78-2 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8511, at 5385 (1978)
(Dash, Arb.). See also United Tel. Co., 78 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 865, 870 (1982) (Clarke, Arb.);
Bergstrom Paper Co., 77-1 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8009, at 3046 (1976) (Mueller,
Arb.); York Water Co., 60 Lab Arb. (BNA) 90, 92 (1972) (Tripp, Arb.).
177. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 59 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 72, 74-75 (1972) (Nicholas, Arb.)
(emphasis added); see also Glen-Gery Corp., 83-1 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8111, at 3498
(1983) (Gates, Arb.).
178. Whirlpool Corp. v. Marshall, 445 U.S. 1 (1980) upheld the Secretary of Labor's
promulgation of a rule under section 1 I(c)(1) of OSHA, 29 U.S.C. § 660(c)(1) (1982), that
allowed workers to refuse to work when
(1) the employee is ordered by his employer to work under conditions that the
employee reasonably believes pose an imminent risk of death or serious bodily
injury, and (2) the employee has reason to believe that there is not sufficient
time or opportunity either to seek effective redress from his employer or to
apprise OSHA of the danger.
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tive proof, combined with the insubordination mode of analysis,
puts a heavy burden of proof upon the employee, rather than em-
phasizing the obligations OSHA places upon management and the
rights the law confers upon employees. As the Supreme Court has
stated:
The Act does not wait for an employee to die or become injured. It autho-
rizes the promulgation of health and safety standards and the issuance of
citations in the hope that these will act to prevent deaths or injuries from
ever occurring. It would seem anomalous to construe an act so directed and
constructed as prohibiting an employee, with no other reasonable alterna-
tive, the freedom to withdraw from a workplace environment that he rea-
sonably believes is highly dangerous.179
Cases decided under OSHA are also in clear contrast to an-
other arbitral presumption: that it is the worker, not the em-
ployer, who is ultimately responsible for accidents. OSHA, con-
trary to the arbitral approach, requires an employer "to prevent
and suppress hazardous conduct by employees, and this duty is not
qualified by such common law doctrines as assumption of risk,
contributory negligence, or comparative negligence. 18 0 Under
OSHA, an employer must:
[T]ake steps to prevent and suppress hazardous conduct by employees, in-
cluding proper training and supervision of employees. An employer is not an
insurer, and need not take steps to prevent hazards which are not generally
foreseeable. . . but at the same time an employer must do all it feasibly can
to prevent foreseeable hazards, including dangerous conduct by its employ-
ees .... 2 1
Id. at 10-11.
The rule itself, 29 C.F.R. § 1977.12 (1985), requires employees to show four elements.
First, the condition under which the employee has refused to work "must be of
such a nature that a reasonable person ... would conclude that there is a real
danger of death or serious injury." Second, there must have been insufficient
time to eliminate the danger through the Act's regular enforcement mecha-
nism. Third, "where possible," the employee must have sought from his em-
ployer a correction of the dangerous condition. Finally, the employee's refusal
to work must have been in good faith.
Note, supra note 167, at 563. The court's use of these elements have led to the "creation
of implicit tests, less objective than the test used in section 502 [29 U.S.C. § 143 (1982)]
cases, but more objective than the good-faith test used in section 7 [29 U.S.C. § 157
(1982)] cases." Id. at 564.
179. Whirlpool Corp., 445 U.S. at 12.
180. National Realty & Constr. Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Rev. Comm'n,
489 F.2d 1257, 1266 n.36 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
181. General Dynamics Corp. v. Occupational Safety & Health Rev. Comm'n, 599
F.2d 453, 458 (1st Cir. 1979); see also Usery v. Marquette Cement Mfg. Co., 568 F.2d 902,
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As one commentator has noted, in OSHA refusal cases the
courts presume the workers' good faith and "have been fairly lib-
eral in construing the requirements of the regulation. They have
avoided ... strict requirements ... while at the same time they
have protected employers against frivolous refusals."182
Key cases decided under the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA) and the Labor-Management Relations Act (LMRA) re-
garding refusals to work for reasons of health and safety identify
standards of proof to be used under those statutes. Section 7 of
the NLRA gives employees the right "to engage in. . . concerted
activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual
aid or protection," 8 ' including health and safety related activities.
A concerted refusal to work due to unsafe working conditions is,
therefore, protected under section 7. Such a refusal by unionized
employees, however, may run afoul of a no-strike clause in a col-
lective bargaining agreement, or, under the Steelworkers Trilogy
principle,'" an implied no-strike agreement where grievance and
binding arbitration are contractually agreed upon dispute resolu-
tion procedures. In such situations, a refusal to work due to un-
safe working conditions may be protected by section 502 of the
LMRA, which provides that the "quitting of labor by an employee
or employees in good faith because of abnormally dangerous con-
ditions for work at the place of employment [shall not] be deemed
a strike .. ,"1185
The Supreme Court interprets section 7 as requiring that an
employee need show only good faith in refusing to perform an
allegedly unsafe task. According to the Supreme Court, the rea-
sonableness of employees' decisions to engage in concerted activ-
ity is irrelevant because the central purpose of section 7 is the
guarantee of concerted activity for mutual aid or protection. In
NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co.,' for example, where machine
shop employees engaged in a concerted refusal to work in an un-
heated shop on a cold day, the Court ruled: "At the very most,
910 (2d Cir. 1977).
182. Note, supra note 167, at 567.
183. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982).
184. United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960);
United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steel-
workers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
185. 29 U.S.C. § 143 (1982).
186. 370 U.S. 9 (1962).
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that fact might tend to indicate that the conduct of men in leaving
was unnecessary and unwise, and it has long been settled that the
reasonableness of workers' decisions to engage in concerted activ-
ity is irrelevant to the determination of whether a labor dispute
exits or not."'"" The Court's use of the good faith standard of
proof, rarely used by arbitrators, places a light burden of proof
upon employees, thus placing primary value on the protection of
concerted activity.
In contrast to section 7's clear protection of concerted activity
in the pursuit of a safe workplace, arbitrators view concerted ac-
tivity as an even more dangerous threat to management authority
than individual refusals to work. Concerted refusals imply an
added dimension of "collusion to interrupt the flow of work and
hence a deliberate challenge to [management's] authority to direct
the working force."1 8s Refusals to work that might be acceptable
if they involved only a single employee become unacceptable
when carried out concertedly because they are "premeditated. 18 9
The ironic result of this arbitral approach is that concerted activ-
ity may be less protected than individual refusal even when a no-
strike clause is not in effect. One arbitrator, after examining other
arbitration opinions concerning this issue, stated that he was
not aware of any support in principle or precedent for the proposition that
an individual employe ... may rely on his personal belief that a job is un-
duly hazardous as a valid basis for preventing other employes from perform-
ing it. The protection afforded by Arbitration Decisions to individual refus-
als to work in a situation believed to be hazardous does not, as far as I know,
187. 370 U.S. at 16.
The findings of the Board ... show a running dispute between the machine
shop employees and the company over the heating of the shop on cold days-a
dispute which culminated in the decision of the employees to act concertedly in
an effort to force the company to improve that condition of their employment.
The fact that the company was already making every effort to repair the fur-
nace and bring heat into the shop that morning does not change the nature of
the controversy that caused the walkout. At the very most, that fact might tend
to indicate that the conduct of the men in leaving was unnecessary and unwise,
and it has long been settled that the reasonableness of workers' decisions to
engage in concerted activity is irrelevant to the determination of whether a la-
bor dispute exists or not.
Id. at 15-16.
188. U.S. Plywood-Champion Papers, Inc., 50 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 115, 124 (1968) (Jen-
kins, Arb.) (emphasis added).
189. Galis Mfg. Co., 46 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 75, 79 (1966) (Wood, Arb.); see also South-
ern Ohio Coal Co., 66 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 446, 449 (1976) (Lubow, Arb.).
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extend to collective action.""0
The Supreme Court's interpretation of section 502 of the
LMRA, however, establishes a much more stringent standard than
section 7. A union must present, as in most arbitrations, "ascer-
tainable, objective evidence supporting its conclusion that an ab-
normally dangerous condition for work exists" in order to obtain
section 502's protection.9 1 The Court bases its narrow interpreta-
tion of section 502, a provision devoid of legislative history, upon
an "unwilling[ness] to conclude that Congress intended the public
policy favoring arbitration and peaceful resolution of labor dis-
putes to be circumvented by so slender a thread as subjective
judgment, however honest it may be. ' 192 That policy leads to a
strict standard of objective proof which, as in the arbitration
cases, places a heavy burden of proof upon the worker.
Despite the similarity of the judicial interpretation of section
502 and the arbitral approach to standard of proof in refusal to
work cases, most arbitrators do not acknowledge workers' statu-
tory rights regardless of whether those rights emanate from sec-
tion 502 or section 7 of the LMRA or from OSHA. One arbitra-
tor, for example, responded to a worker's claim that he had a
statutory right to refuse unsafe work by telling the employee that
he
and his family misread and misunderstood the provisions of [section 502 of
the LMRA]. Nothing in section 502, or any other provision of the [LMRA]
negates or modifies in any way the right of management to assign its employ-
ees to a lawful and contractually obligated duty or immunizes employees
from discipline up to and including discharge for refusal to perform such
duties.'
190. Chrysler Corp., 63 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 677, 684 (1974) (Alexander, Arb.).
191. Gateway Coal Co. v. UMW, 414 U.S. 368, 387 (1974).
192. Id. at 386. J. ATLEsoN, supra note 1, discussing 29 U.S.C. § 143 (1982) contends,
[a]s in many areas of the labor law, the function of a standard is to shift certain
risks. In this area, the issue is who should bear the risks of a good-faith walkout
that, it ultimately appears, was not in response to an objectively established "ab-
normally hazardous" condition. A Board trial examiner expressed the dilemma:
"[the objective evidence requirement] places a heavy burden on employees,
who must act without the benefit of medical advice and whose choice places
either their jobs or their health in jeopardy." The Court chose to place the
"risk" upon employees because of the value of continued, uninterrupted pro-
duction and the assumption that employees are unreliable and irresponsible
judges of workplace safety.
Id. at 100.
193. Consolidated Edison Co., 71 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 238, 242 (1978) (Kelly, Arb.).
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In the few cases where arbitrators do consider and give sub-
stantial weight to worker's statutory right to refuse unsafe work,
the insubordination mode of analysis can become secondary to or,
at least, separate from, the safety question:
T19
The issue to be decided is deceptively simple. The fact is that some of
the grievants did go to extreme and the outer limits of reason in their pro-
tests and in their defiance of the employer. . . . But even this behavior has a
counterpoint. This other side of the coin has to do with an honest belief that
grievants, and other plant employees, had been made to work under unsafe
and unhealthy working conditions. It is no secret that federal labor law pro-
tects employees by granting them the right to strike over unsafe working
conditions.
It is important to note that the OSHA Act [sic] affords employees the
same right to leave the workplace when they in good faith believe they are
at risk to their own safety.
[A]lthough the arbitrator has determined that grievants resorted to
completely unacceptable measures of protests, their conduct, individual and
collective, was not indefensible. Their concern was sincere and the matter
protested was of such great importance-not only to plant employees but to
the employer as well.
These grievances have been resolved on the basis of the good faith per-
ception of grievants that they were being required to perform work under
plant conditions that were unhealthy and even dangerous. Their complaints
of headaches were real and were not a pretext to evade their assigned tasks.
Of course, they overreacted to the immediacy of the danger and should have
referred the matter to their Union representative. But their conduct was not
so outrageous as to lose the benefit of their contractual and statutory
protection.1 5
Differing value judgments of courts, as opposed to arbitra-
tors, in refusal to work cases leads to contradictory results: one set
reached by arbitrators concerned primarily with management
rights, and a different set by courts who are interpreting statutes
concerned primarily with workers' rights to a safe and healthful
workplace.
The same sort of contradictory approaches are evident in
194. Welco Mfg. Co., 80 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 273 (1983) (Yarowsky, Arb.); B&1W Constr.
Co., 80-2 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 1 8445, at 4986-87 (1980) (Belcher, Arb.).
195. Welco Mfg. Co., 80 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 273, 275-76 (1983) (Yarowski, Arb.) (cita-
tion omitted). For examples of arbitration decisions based at least in part on alternative
approaches to health and safety dispute resolution, see supra notes 14-17 and accompany-
ing text and infra note 204.
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comparing disease and disability cases decided by arbitrators with
court cases involving handicapped individuals under the Rehabili-
tation Act of 1973. Section 504 of the Act provides that "[n]o
otherwise qualified handicapped individual . . . shall, solely by
reason of his handicap, be excluded from the participation in, be
denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under
any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance
"196
As previously discussed, many arbitrators sustain manage-
ment's right to discharge based upon unsupported management
assertions that allegedly disabled employees are or will be health
or safety threats to themselves, or might cause the company eco-
nomic loss. Following the policy set by the Rehabilitation Act, the
courts take a distinctly different approach.
The importance of preserving job opportunities for the handicapped set a
high standard for the effectiveness of job qualifications that adversely affect
the handicapped. The regulation makes consistency with business necessity
an independent requirement, and the courts must be wary that business ne-
cessity is not confused with mere expediency. If a job qualification is to be
permitted to exclude handicapped individuals, it must be directly connected
with, and must substantially promote, "business necessity and safe perform-
ance." The [employer] had the burden of demonstrating that its job qualifi-
cations met this standard. 19 7
The courts do not accept generalized management assertions
of current safety hazard, risk of future injury, or long-term health
problems. The courts require management to produce specific
proof, often in the form of expert testimony, to support such as-
sertions.198 These evidentiary requirements, which put the burden
of proof upon management, would lead to a different result if ap-
plied in the arbitration case in which the arbitrator, eager to up-
hold management's right to "protect" the worker and thus keep
the workplace safe, removes the worker from the workplace based
upon little or no evidence of real danger. As one court noted:
It would be a rare case indeed in which a hostile discriminatory purpose or
196. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982).
197. Bentivegna v. United States Dep't of Labor, 694 F.2d 619, 621-22 (9th Cir.
1982).
198. E.g., Southwestern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 400-04 (1979);
Bentivegna v. United States Dep't of Labor, 694 F.2d 619, 621-23 (9th Cir. 1982); Pushkin
v. Regents of the Univ. of Colo., 658 F.2d 1372, 1382-83 (10th Cir. 1981); E.E. Black, Ltd.
v. Marshall, 497 F. Supp. 1088, 1103-04 (D. Hawaii 1980).
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subjective intent to discriminate solely on the basis of handicap could be
shown. Discrimination on the basis of handicap usually results from more
invidious causative elements and often occurs under the guise of extending a
helping hand or a mistaken, restrictive belief as to the limitations of handi-
capped persons.1 99
CONCLUSION
The analysis of these published decisions does more than con-
firm the existence of value premises in the decisions of labor arbi-
trators. It reveals that the management rights value judgment is
dominant and that this value judgment clearly controls the ap-
pearance and use of another value judgment: the notion that a
worker has a right to a safe and healthful workplace. More specifi-
cally, most arbitrators make safety and health concerns paramount
only when those claims support management rights. The four ma-
jor categories of decisions read together constitute a classic illus-
tration of how the acceptance of a certain value judgment deter-
mines a decision-maker's whole orientation when deciding an
200issue.
One fundamental question raised by these findings is what
value judgment should control at the workplace when workers'
health and safety are concerned. The long-standing dominance in
United States industrial history of the proposition that manage-
ment rights must take precedence over all else should not obscure
a more humane value judgment, one more in keeping with cur-
rent law and policy concerning worker health and safety-a value
judgment that would make the workers' right to a safe and health-
ful workplace paramount. As our review of safety rule and disease
and disability cases has illustrated, arbitrators do, in fact, recog-
nize workers' health and safety value judgments as important and
valid, even "paramount," but only where these value judgments
coincide with management rights.20 1 Where, as in the refusal to
work and crew size cases, a worker health and safety value judg-
199. Pushkin v. Regents of the Univ. of Colo., 658 F.2d 1372, 1385 (10th Cir. 1981).
200. A recent survey of American Arbitration Association members revealed that the
management rights theory "is alive and well as far as most arbitrators are concerned. ...
Only about one-quarter of the respondents disagreed with the view that, if an item is not
covered in the agreement, they must assume that it is reserved to management." DAILY
LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 234, § E, at 8 (Dec. 5, 1984) (Report of American Arbitration Associ-
ation Survey of Labor Arbitrators).
201. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 97-101 & 138-43.
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ment comes into conflict with management rights concepts of
profit, property, authority, efficiency, cost-benefit analysis, tech-
nology or "progress," worker health and safety is relegated, at
most, to a range of secondary considerations.
The current weighing of priorities in refusal to work cases is
in part the result of arbitrators' interpretations and applications of
the Shulman "work first, grieve later" rule. As we have discussed,
the result of the rule's application in refusal to work cases is that
arbitrators treat health and safety as an affirmative defense to an
insubordination charge. We propose that arbitrators instead make
health and safety an exception to Shulman's rule in the dictionary
sense of "exception": "[A] case to which a rule does not apply. '20 2
Arbitral acceptance and application of the Shulman rule has
made insubordination and, thus, management rights, the primary
focus in cases involving a refusal to work for reasons of health and
safety. If, instead, the health and safety aspect of the case was
made primary, employers would carry the burden of proving that
workplaces were in fact safe or healthful or that work assignments
did not in fact endanger the health or safety of their employees.
This approach would put the burden of proof on the party who is
responsible for providing, and has the primary power and control
in maintaining a safe and healthful place to work. It would also
reflect a value judgment that such refusals to work are health and
safety disputes, rather than primarily matters of insubordination.
More specifically, arbitrators would approach these cases in
the following manner: The employer has the burden of proving
that the aspect of the workplace or work assignment at issue was
safe. If the employer fails to carry that burden, the grievance is
sustained and that is the end of it. If the employer successfully
carries this burden of proof, then the employee would be required
to demonstrate a good faith or reasonable belief that the work-
place or work assignment was a threat to health or safety. If the
employee successfully carries this burden, the grievance is sus-
tained. If not, the insubordination question could then be consid-
ered. This approach would ensure not only the primacy of health
and safety concerns, but would also prevent workers from being
confronted with the unfair dilemma now imposed upon them-to
work and risk their health and safety or to refuse to work and risk
202. WmsR's NEw CoLLEG A DICTIONARY 432 (9th ed. 1983).
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their jobs.20 3
The Shulman rule, however, constitutes only a part of the is-
sues raised in this Article. Arbitral use of the suggested changes,
in both the Shulman rule and the usual arbitral approach in re-
fusal cases, cannot .by itself alter the predominant management
rights value judgment that shapes most arbitrators' perspectives
on cases involving worker health and safety. Only arbitral adop-
tion of the value judgment that nothing is more important at the
workplace than human life and health would change completely
arbitrators' current orientation to all four categories of cases dis-
cussed in this paper. °4
Some maintain that the specific character of health and safety
disputes distinguishes them from other disputes arising under a
collective bargaining agreement, thereby justifying their removal
from arbitration. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals in the Gate-
way Coal case, for example, upheld a union claim that work safety
203. For a discussion of four cases that at least partly shift the burden to the em-
ployer-although only one of them shifts the burden in the absence of explicit contractual
language-see supra notes 11-13 and accompanying text.
204. For examples of some of the few cases that illustrate an arbitral approach to
health and safety disputes contrary to the more prevalent ("majority") approach described
in this Article, see Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 79-1 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) T 8001, at 3009
(1978) (Epstein, Arb.) (crew size: "We find that if there is any danger whatsoever of safety
or health hazards, then all reasonable precautionary measures should be taken."); Carna-
tion Co., 60 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 674, 676 (1973) (Hayes, Arb.) (disease and disability: "Where
there is no basis or evidence to support management's judgment of fitness and where the
employee has a long and excellent record of employment coupled with seniority rights and
contractual benefits, it must be concluded that the Company acted unfairly and unreasona-
bly."); Delman Co., 66-3 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) % 8989, at 6445 (1966) (Jenkins, Arb.)
(refusal case: "To justify their position that the area was unsafe, the grievants ought not to
be expected to exhibit the symptoms of serious carbon monoxide poisoning."); Union Car-
bide & Carbon Corp., 16 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 707, 710 (1951) (Schedler, Arb.) (safety rule:
"the Company has utterly failed to show that many of the employees in this grievance are
completely unexposed to radioactive substances, and therefore do not need clothing for
their health and safety"); Hegeler Zinc Co., 8 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 826 (1947) (Elson, Arb.)
(refusal case)
Resort to the grievance procedure is not an antidote to pneumonia nor can it
be said that where there is an actual hazard to life and limb, it is the intent of
the parties to the collective bargaining agreement that no matter what the cir-
cumstances, the order must be obeyed. The collective bargaining agreement is
concerned with human beings. In the normal employment relationship, it is
true there are emergencies which require prompt and disciplined obedience,
but discipline essential in an army, that of an unqualified duty to obey, has no
place in the ordinary industrial management relationship.
Id. at 831.
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disputes were not subject to arbitration:
Considerations of economic peace that favor arbitration of ordinary
disputes have little weight here. Men are not wont to submit matters of life
or death to arbitration and no enlightened society encourages, much less
requires them to do so. If employees believe that correctable circumstances
are unnecessarily adding to the normal dangers of their hazardous employ-
ment, there is no sound reason for requiring them to subordinate their judg-
ment to that of an arbitrator, however impartial he may be. The arbitrator
is not staking his life on his impartial decision. It should not be the policy of
the law to force the employees to stake theirs on his judgment.2 0 5
That the Supreme Court overruled the third circuit in Gateway
Coal206 by deciding that health and safety cases are subject to arbi-
tration does not change the life and death nature of these cases.
Serious questions remain of the ability of arbitration to deal ade-
quately with these issues. 207
First, arbitrators in the main make the decision to ignore ex-
ternal laws concerning health and safety, a choice that deprives
arbitrators of access, not only to alternative values and public pol-
icy guidelines, but also to important and relevant data (such as
OSHA standards) concerning occupational safety and health.
Safety and health disputes also routinely involve technical matters
beyond the expertise of most arbitrators; a situation requiring, at
least, the creation of special panels of arbitrators with demon-
strated qualifications in this area. Finally, the traditional arbitral
remedy power is often inadequate to deal not only with the broad
scope of certain health and safety problems that range far beyond
the situation of a single grievant, but also with the long-term ef-
fects of working with certain job-related materials and processes
205. Gateway Coal Co. v. UMW, 466 F.2d 1157, 1160 (3d Cir. 1972), rev'd, 414 U.S.
368 (1974).
206. Gateway Coal Co. v. UMW, 414 U.S. 368 (1974).
207. Some of these questions have been raised by the Supreme Court in more recent
rulings on judicial deference to arbitration in cases dealing with workers' "nonwaivable
public law right[s]." Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 737
(1981) (quoting Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 51 (1974)).
In Barrentine and Gardner-Denver, the Court found that arbitration awards dealing with
claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act, see 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1982), and Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1982), do not bar subse-
quent independent judicial review of the merits of a grievant's Fair Labor Standards Act or
Title VII claim. The treatment of worker health and safety claims, similarly covered by the
existence of a variety of federal statutes, see supra text accompanying notes 166-99, involve
concerns similar to those the Court expressed in Barrentine and Gardner-Denver. See gener-
ally Barrentine, 450 U.S. at 739-46; Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. at 53-60.
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such as toxic chemicals, radiation and asbestos.
It is possible that these defects can be wholly or partially elim-
inated. But this study has demonstrated that as a consequence of
the adoption and implementation of a management rights value
judgment, arbitration has become part of an industrial relations
system that has as its aim the maintenance of managerial control
over all aspects of an enterprise. Arbitrators give health and safety
priority only insofar as the assertion of the health and safety value
judgment supports this managerial control, as in the safety rule
and disease and disability cases. When the health and safety of the
worker conflicts with the goals of managerial control, as in the
refusal to work and crew size cases, management rights reign
supreme.
Given the structure and nature of the arbitration process, the
pervasiveness of the management rights value judgment, and the
absence of any direct or systematic way to bring about change in
arbitral values, there appears to be little chance that labor arbitra-
tors will place the safety and health of men and women at the
workplace above all other considerations. As Justice Benjamin
Cardozo noted, however, "if a rule continues to work injustice, it
will eventually be reformulated. The principles themselves are
continually retested; for if the rules derived from a principle do
not work well, the principle itself must ultimately be re-ex-
amined."2 °0 We hope that by identifying the management rights
value judgment and its dominance in health and safety matters ar-
bitrators will recognize that change is needed.
208. B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 23 (1921) (quoting M. SmITH,
JURISPRUDENCE 21 (1909)).
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Appendix
Table 1
Grievance Outcomes in Health and Safety Cases
Type of Total Number Grievances Grievances Grievances







safety (154) 55 32 67
Safety 196
rule (191) 44 30 117
Crew size 65
reduction (62) 11 4 47
Disease and 61





conditions (99) 25 14 60
Total Cases 584
Examined (564) 141 93 330
*The total of each outcome column is less than the total number of cases found in each
category due to circumstances such as insufficient information in the published cases and
retention ofjurisdiction by an arbitrator which prevented a determination of outcome in a
few cases in each category. The number in parentheses indicates the number of cases in
which we could determine a specific outcome.
**For refusal to work cases, this column represents any modification of the original pen-
alty. For the other types of cases, this column represents split decisions involving two or
more grievants, outcomes to be based on future acts, special circumstances, or additional
information to be provided to the arbitrator.
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Type of Objective Objective Proof














*In the remainder of the refusal to work cases, no standard of proof was discussed or could
be determined with confidence.
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*In the remainder of the refusal to work cases, no standard of proof was discussed or could
be determined with confidence.
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Table 2
Standard of Proof in Refusal to Work Cases
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Table 4
Standards of Proof in Refusal to Work Cases




















30 29 11 38
Reason-
able
Belief
0
1
1
5
7
5
4
6
Good
Faith
Belief
0
1
2
2
3
2
1
0
No
Information
4
4
3
4
6
6
8
3

